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Abstract—Speech and speaker recognition systems are em-
ployed in a variety of applications, from personal assistants to
telephony surveillance and biometric authentication. The wide
deployment of these systems has been made possible by the
improved accuracy in neural networks. Like other systems based
on neural networks, recent research has demonstrated that
speech and speaker recognition systems are vulnerable to attacks
using manipulated inputs. However, as we demonstrate in this
paper, the end-to-end architecture of speech and speaker systems
and the nature of their inputs make attacks and defenses against
them substantially different than those in the image space. We
demonstrate this first by systematizing existing research in this
space and providing a taxonomy through which the community
can evaluate future work. We then demonstrate experimentally
that attacks against these models almost universally fail to
transfer. In so doing, we argue that substantial additional work
is required to provide adequate mitigations in this space.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voice Processing Systems (VPSes) are a critical inter-
face for both classical and emerging systems. While by no
means conceptually new, the last decade has seen a dramatic
improvement in both Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR)
and Speaker Identification (SI) VPSes. Such interfaces are
not merely for convenience; rather, they drastically improve
usablity for groups such as the elderly and the visually im-
pared [1], [2], make devices without screens such as headless
IoT systems accessible [3], and make user authentication
nearly invisible [4], [5].
Advances in neural networks have helped make VPSes
practical. Although different architectures have been used in
the past (e.g., Hidden Markov models), systems built atop
neural networks now dominate the space. While neural net-
works have enabled significant improvements in transcription
and identification accuracy, substantial literature in the field
of adversarial machine learning shows that they are also
vulnerable to a wide array of attacks. In particular, the research
community has put forth significant effort to demonstrate
that image classification and, only recently, VPSes built on
neural networks are vulnerable to exploitation using small
perturbations to their inputs.
While it may be tempting to view VPSes as simply an-
other application of neural networks and to therefore assume
that previous work on adversarial machine learning applies
directly to this new application, this paper shows that this is
demonstrably untrue. We make the following contributions:
• Taxonomization of VPS Threat Models: Attacks on
VPSes are conducted using a number of widely differ-
ing (sometimes implicit) assumptions about adversarial
behavior and ability. We provide the first framework for
reasoning more broadly about work in this space.
• Categorization of Existing Work: We take the body of
work on attacks and defenses for VPSes and categorize
them based on the above taxonomy. We show that while
many papers have already been published, significant
work remains to be done.
• Experimental Testing of Transferability: We demon-
strate that transferability, or the ability to exploit multiple
models using an adversarial input is not currently achiev-
able against VPSes via attacks that rely on gradient-based
optimization [6]. Through extensive experimentation, we
show that transferability is currently extremely unlikely
even when considering two instances of the same VPSes
trained separately on the same train-test splits, hyper-
parameters, initial random seeds and architecture. The
methodology and results for the experiments can be found
in the Appendix.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II provides background information on VPSes; Section III
discusses the special considerations that must be understood
when attacking VPSes; Sections VI and IV details our threat
model taxonomy; Section V then identifies the novel con-
tributions of published work through this taxonomy; Sec-
tion VII explores currently proposed defense and detection
mechanisms; Section XI-A explores transferability and why
optimization attacks currently fail to provide this property
for VPSes; Section VIII discusses open issues; Section IX
provides concluding remarks and the Appendix details the
methodology and results for the transferability experiments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Psychoacoustics
Modern speech recognition systems are designed to approx-
imate the functioning of the human auditory system [7]. Re-
search in psychoacoustics has revealed the complex ways with
which the human brain processes audio. For example, there
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Figure 1: The steps that form the Automatic Speech Recognition pipeline. (a) The audio is recorded using a microphone. (b) It
is prepossessed to remove any rudimentary noise or high frequencies using a low pass filter. (c) The audio is passed through a
feature extraction function (in this case the MFCC function) that extracts the most important features of the audio sample. (d)
The features are passed on to the model for inference, which outputs a non-human-readable string. (e) The string is decoded
to produce a human-readable transcription.
is a difference between the actual intensity and the brain’s
perceived intensity of an audio tone. Therefore, the perception
of loudness is non-linear with respect to intensity [8]. In order
to double the brain’s perceived intensity, one must increase
the actual intensity by a factor of eight. Similarly, the limit of
human hearing ranges from 20Hz to 20kHz. Any frequency
outside this range (e.g., ultrasound (20kHz to 10 MHz)),
can not be heard. The brain employs complex processes to
understand speech in noisy environments or during cross-talk.
These include visual cues, pitch separation, intensity, binural
unmasking, context, and memory [8].
B. Voice Processing Systems (VPSes)
Researchers have developed VPSes to capture functionality
of the human auditory system, albeit coarsely. VPSes are
of two types: ASR systems and SI systems. ASR systems
convert speech to text. SI systems attempt to identify a person
by their speech samples. There are a wide variety of ASR
and SI systems in use today, including personal assistants
(e.g., Google Home [9], Amazon Alexa [10], Siri [11]),
telephony surveillance systems [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], and
conferencing transcription services [17].
The modern ASR system pipeline consists of the steps
shown in Figure1. Due to the similarity of the SI and ASR
pipelines, in this subsection we define the pipeline in the
context of ASR. The steps include the following:
1) Preprocessing: The audio sample is first passed through
a preprocessing phase (Figure 1(b)). Here, segments of audio
containing human speech are identified using voice-activity
detection algorithms, such as G.729 [18]. Next, these selected
segments are passed through a low-pass filter to remove high
frequencies. This helps to improve ASR accuracy by removing
the unnecessary noise from the samples.
2) Feature Extraction: The filtered audio is divided into
overlapping frames, usually 20 ms in length [19], to capture
the transitions in the signal. Each frame is then passed to
the feature extraction step (Figure 1(c)). To approximate the
human auditory system, the most commonly used algorithm
is the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) [19],
which extracts the features that the human ear considers most
important. The MFCC is comprised of four steps (Figure 1(c)):
a) Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT): The DFT of the
audio sample is computed first (Figure 1(c.i)). It converts a
time domain signal into the frequency domain representa-
tion [20]:
Fk =
N−1∑
n=0
sn
(
cos[
pi
N
(n+
1
2
)k]− i · sin[ pi
N
(n+
1
2
)k]
)
where the real and imaginary parts are used to infer the phase
of the signal and intensity of a frequency. F = (F1, ..., FN )
is a vector of complex numbers, N is the total number of
samples, n is the sample number, k is the frequency number,
and sn is the n-th sample of the input. The magnitude of
Fk corresponds to the intensity of the k-th frequency in s.
The DFT output, called the spectrum, provides a fine-grained
understanding of an audio sample’s frequency composition.
b) Mel Filtering: As previously mentioned, the human
auditory system treats frequencies in a non-linear manner. To
recreate this effect, the Mel filter scales the intensities of the
frequencies accordingly (Figure 1(c.ii)), using the following:
mk = 2595 log10
(
1 +
|Fk|
700
)
where mk is the resulting Mel scaled frequency intensity. The
scale assigns a higher weight to frequencies that exist between
100Hz and 8kHz [21]. This is done to amplify the frequencies
that constitute human speech.
c) Log Scaling: The output of the Mel-filter is scaled by
the log function (Figure 1(c.iii)). This reproduces logarithmic
perception exhibited by the human auditory system.
d) Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT): The DCT (Fig-
ure 1(c.iv)) [21] decomposes an input into a series of co-
sine components. The components that represent most of the
information about the input are retained, while the rest are
discarded. This is done using the following equation:
Fk =
N−1∑
n=0
sn cos
(
(2n+ 1)kpi
2N
)
where Fk is the intensity of the kth component in s.
3) Inference: The extracted features are finally passed to
a probabilistic model for inference (Figure 1(d)). There are a
variety of models available for VPSes. However, we focus on
neural networks as they are the dominant choice in this space.
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Figure 2: Example of a simple beam search decoder. The input
data (a) is fed into an RNN as shown in (b) which gives
the distribution of the outputs. In this example the possible
output characters are {l,o,c,k,-} shown in (c) and with their
distributions the beam search calculates the probability of
different sequences (d). Using those sequence probabilities,
the CTC beam search calculates the probability of different
outputs.
a) Convolutional Neural Network (CNN): A neural net-
work with more than one hidden layers is called a Deep Neural
Network (DNN). A special type of DNN is a CNN in which
each layer of the CNN is made up of a set of filters that are
convolved with the layer’s input to obtain a new representation
of the data. However, interpreting exactly what each hidden
layer has learned is an open problem [22].
CNNs have one major limitation: they take a fixed-sized
input and produce a fixed-sized output. This is ideal for
image recognition, where images can be down-sampled or
up-sampled to a specific size. However CNNs may be too
constrained for applications such as speech recognition, where
each input can be of arbitrary length and down-sampling can
result in loosing contextual information.
b) Recurrent Neural Network (RNN): An RNN over-
comes this limitation of CNNs. An RNN takes a variable-sized
input and can produce a variable-sized output. This is ideal for
VPSes, as speech input can be of variable length as a result
of varying pronunciation speeds of the speaker and different
sentences having a variable number of words. Additionally,
RNNs are designed to use contextual information, which is
important for VPSes. An RNN accumulates this context in
a hidden state, which is fed to the RNN as it processes the
following steps of an input sequence. The hidden state acts as
an internal memory unit by ‘remembering’ the information
about the previous time steps. For example, consider the
phrase “Mary had a little ”. Intuitively, an RNN uses
information about the past to fill in the missing word (i.e.,
“lamb”). This behavior is critical for ASRs as human speech
has a relatively consistent temporal structure: the word at time
tn generally depends on words spoken at tm where m < n.
4) Decoding: The decoding stage is shown in Figure 2.
For each 20 ms frame (Figure 2(a)), the inference step
(Figure 2(b)) produces a probability distribution over all the
characters (Figure 2(c)). The model then produces a two-
dimensional (character × total time) matrix of probabilities
(Figure 2(d)). In the image domain, one typically picks the la-
bel corresponding to the largest probability as the final output.
In contrast, doing so in an ASR will not necessarily produce
a correct transcription. As a result, there are multiple possible
transcriptions for a single audio file [23]. For example, as seen
in Figure 2(d), for the audio sample with the word “lock”,
a model may produce multiple strings such as “llo-ockk” or
“ll-ok-kk”. The output strings are not reader friendly, since
they reflect speaker characteristics like speed and accent. To
overcome this problem, the decoding stage of the ASR system
converts the model output string into words (Figure 2(e)). One
of the most commonly used decoding algorithms is Beam
Search [24]. It is charged with selecting a sequence of tokens
based on a distribution of probabilities over dictionary words,
which the model predicts for each token. This heuristic is
commonly employed to explore multiple sequences without
being too sensitive to the model’s prediction at each step of the
sequence. This is a heuristic that always outputs the most likely
word for a given label string, thus the output transcription is
not guaranteed to be optimal.
5) Alternative Configurations: There are many possible
configurations for an ASR pipeline. These can use different
types of voice-activity detection algorithms for preprocessing
(Figure 1(b)) or any variety of feature extraction algorithms
(Figure 1(c)), which include DFTs, MFCCs, or Convolutional
Blocks. Similarly, an ASR system can use any number of
model types for inference, including DNN-HMM [25], DNN-
RNN [26], [5] and HMM-GMM [27], [28]. ASRs with
different configurations are frequently introduced. Given the
popularity of neural networks, we expect non-neural network
VPS configurations to eventually be phased out. As a result,
the focus of our paper is adversarial ML in the space of neural
network based VPSes. This allows us to apply our findings to
a larger population of VPSes.
C. Speaker Identification (SI)
1) Types: SI systems can be broadly classified into two
types: identification and verification. Identification systems
determine the identity of the speaker of a given voice sample.
In contrast, verification system ascertains whether the claimed
identity of a speaker matches the given voice sample. For
simplicity of exposition, we refer to both as SI.
2) ASR vs SI: The modern ASR and SI pipelines are very
similar to each other [29]. Both of them use the overall
structure illustrated in Figure 2. Both systems employ pre-
processing, feature extraction, and inference. However, they
differ at the last stage of the pipeline. While ASRs have a
decoding stage (Figure 2(e)), SIs do not. Instead, an SI directly
outputs the probability distribution across all the speakers
effectively stopping at Figure 2(d).
D. Adversarial Machine Learning in VPSes
The term adversarial machine learning refers to the study of
attacks and defenses for ML systems [30]. Attacks may target
security properties that relate to the integrity or confidentiality
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of the ML system [31]. The former encompasses poisoning
attacks at training time [32] and evasion attacks [33] at test
time. The latter may be concerned with the confidentiality
of data [34] (often also delving into issues that relate to the
privacy of data [35], [36], [37]) or the confidentiality of the
model itself with attacks including model extraction [38], [39].
We focus on evasion attacks, which are often instantiated
using maliciously crafted inputs known as adversarial sam-
ples [40]. Most of the literature on adversarial samples has
been written in the context of computer vision. In this realm,
adversarial samples are produced by introducing perturbations
that do not affect semantics of the image (as validated by
a human observer) but that cause machine learning models
to misclassify the image. All existing attacks in the audio
space are evasion attacks, which naturally results in our
systematization of knowledge addressing evasion attacks. We
do however discuss other types attacks in Section VIII.
1) Motivating Example: Consider the example of an ASR.
The goal of the adversary is to perturb an audio sample such
that an ASR and a human transcribe the same audio differently.
This perturbed audio sample, for example, can be music [41],
noise [7], silence [42] or even human speech [6]. This type of
attack can trick humans into thinking that the perturbed sample
is benign, but can force the voice-enabled home assistant
to execute illicit bank transactions, unlock smart doors, etc.
Similarly, in the case of SI, the attacker might want to perturb
an audio file so that the SI misidentifies the speaker.
The goal of the adversary is to find an algorithm capable
of producing perturbations imperceptible to a human listener,
yet still triggers the desired action from the voice assistant.
This would ensure that victims only realize they have been
attacked once the damage is done, if they realize at all.
2) Crafting Adversarial Samples: Attack algorithms craft
adversarial samples by performing gradient-based optimiza-
tion. Because it is possible to approximate gradients using
finite-difference methods sufficiently for the purpose of finding
adversarial samples [43], we describe this attack strategy as-
suming that the adversary has access to the model’s gradients.
The adversary solves an optimization problem whose ob-
jective is forcing the model to output a different label, subject
to constraints that ensure the modified input maintains the
semantics that correspond to the original label.
min
‖δ‖
l(f(x+ δ), y) + c · ‖δ‖ (1)
This formulation, due to Szegedy et al. [40], involves a loss
function l : x, y 7→ l(f(x), y) measuring how far the model f ’s
predictions are from label y for input x. The adversary who’s
optimizing for a targeted transcription needs to find a targeted
adversarial sample x∗ = x+δ for which model f erroneously
outputs the label y, which is chosen by the adversary and
differs from the correct label assigned to input x. If instead
the adversary is interested in crafting an untargeted adversarial
sample, they replace l(f(x), y) by its negation and set y to
be the correct label of x. This encourages the procedure to
find an input x∗ that maximizes the model’s error, regardless
(b)
(a)START
(c.i)
(d)
END(c.ii)
Input Target ASR
Perturbation Optimization Compare
Figure 3: All iterative adversarial attacks follow the same
general algorithmic steps. (a) An input is passed to the model.
(b) The Target Model processes the input and outputs a label.
(c) If the label does not match the adversaries chosen label,
the input (c.i) and the label (c.ii) are passed to the perturbation
optimization algorithm (d). The algorithm produces a new
adversarial input. These steps are repeated until the Target
Model outputs an adversary chosen label.
of the label predicted by model f . The penalty c · ‖δ‖ loosely
translates the requirement that an input should not be perturbed
excessively, otherwise it will no longer retain semantics that
justify it belonging in its original ground truth class.
For non-convex models such as neural networks, this op-
timization is approximated. Fortunately for the adversary,
properties of neural networks that make them easy to train
with algorithms like stochastic gradient descent also result in
neural networks being easy to attack. In practice, this means
that the adversary can solve the optimization problem, formu-
lated in the previously discussed equation, using optimizers
commonly employed to train neural networks, such as gradient
descent [44] or some of its variants like L-BFGS [40] and
Adam [45]. This often takes the form of a procedure iteratively
modifying the input until it is misclassified (Figure 3).
3) Transferability: When an adversarial sample that was
crafted to be misclassified by Model A is also misclassified
by Model B, even though models A and B are different, we say
that the adversarial sample transfers from model A to B [46].
The two models A and B do not necessarily need to share the
same architecture and weights, nor do they need to be trained
using the same technique and training data. A hypothesis for
transferability is that there is a large volume of error space
found in different models, which leaves a large volume when
these error spaces intersect [47]. Transferability of adversarial
samples is a cornerstone of most attacks in the image domain,
because the property was observed to hold in even highly
dissimilar models [46], [48], [49], [50], [51]. An adversary
can perform an attack without having access to model B by
first training a surrogate model A. The surrogate is trained by
querying the remote model B. Now the adversary can transfer
adversarial samples from model A to model B. This reduces
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the knowledge required for attack success.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST VPSES
One might assume it is possible to extend the existing
literature of attacks from the image space to the audio domain.
This is not the case due to several key differences. We detail
these differences next. They motivate our systematization of
knowledge effort tailored to the audio domain in general and
VPSes in particular.
A. Pre-processing pipeline
Speech recognition pipelines differ significantly from those
employed in image recognition because they pre-process data
before it is analyzed by an ML model (Section II-B). While
image classifiers almost always operate directly on raw pixels
that encode the image, audio classifiers often rely on feature
extraction components that are not learned from the training
data. Instead, these features are extracted using signal process-
ing algorithms that are hard-coded by human experts [19].
This difference enables a whole new class of audio adversar-
ial samples that target discrepancies between feature extraction
techniques and the manner in which humans represent audio
signals. These attacks use signal processing techniques to
achieve the same evasion goals as the optimization-based
attacks presented in Section II-D. Because these VPS attacks
target feature extraction, they are less model-dependent and
work as well as evasion attacks in the image domain even
with limited access to the victim model [7].
B. Sequential models
Since audio is sequential in nature, ML models that solve
audio tasks are learned from architectures that are stateful in
order to capture contextual dependencies in an audio sample.
Recall that neural networks for image recognition have neu-
rons arranged in layers where connections between neurons
are only made between layers. In contrast, recurrent neural
architectures support connections between neurons in the same
layer in order to capture context. This enables the model to
propagate patterns identified in prior time steps as it progresses
temporally through the audio sample (Section II-B3).
Although recurrent neural architectures enable accurate
analysis of audio signals, the temporal dimension increases
the difficulty of performing a successful attack against VPSes.
To craft a perturbation, the adversary now needs to con-
sider all time steps simultaneously. This is referred to as
unrolling in the ML literature. While unrolling enables one
to backpropagate through time, it complicates optimization—
with failures such as exploding or vanishing gradients [52].
Because gradient-based algorithms rely on this optimization
to converge, finding adversarial samples is more challenging.
C. Discrete domains
Audio models had to be adapted to the discrete nature of
language. Whereas images define a continuous input domain
(because pixels are often represented as three floating point
values in ML systems), language is represented as a sequence
of tokens. Each token corresponds to a word included in the
language’s dictionary or a character of the language’s alphabet.
Furthermore, some audio models are “sequence-to-sequence”,
they take in a sequence of words (e.g., as audio) and produce
another sequence of words (e.g., as text). They must handle
the discrete nature of language both at their inputs and outputs.
This introduces particularities when modeling text or speech
to adapt to discrete domains. For instance, tokens are often
projected in a continuous space of smaller dimensionality than
the size of the discrete dictionary with a technique called word
embeddings [53]. This helps expose the relationship between
concepts expressed by different words.
For models defended with gradient masking [54] in the
image domain, the presence of non-differentiable operations
like beam search constrains the adversary to come up with
alternative operations that are differentiable. Otherwise, they
face a large increase in the cost of finding adversarial sam-
ples [55] or, in the worst case, have to resort to brute
force [55]. This means that an attack might not always produce
an adversarial sample that transcribes to the desired target text.
D. Statistical models beyond ML
Despite being replaced gradually with neural networks,
some components of voice-processing systems continue to
involve techniques like Hidden Markov Models [27]. There
is little work on attacking these statistical models, and for
this reason, it is not well understood to what extent they are
vulnerable to adversarial samples. More work needs to adapt
gradient-based optimization attacks that rely on algorithms de-
rived from the backpropagation algorithm to the expectation-
maximization algorithm used with Hidden Markov Models.
This opens a new dimension of attacks, because several
alternatives to Hidden Markov Models exist e.g., CTC [26].
IV. ATTACK THREAT MODEL TAXONOMY
We introduce the first threat model to characterize the
unique contributions and open problems of evasion attacks in
the audio domain. We hope this framework will help draw fair
comparisons between works published on VPSes in the future.
A. Adversarial Goals
We can group the attacker’s goals into two categories of
attacks: untargeted and targeted attacks.
1) Untargeted: Here, the attacker wants the VPS to produce
any output that is different from the original output.
a) SI: The attacker’s goal is to force the SI to misidentify
the speaker of an audio sample. If the model identifies the
speaker of an audio sample as anyone other than the original,
the attacker wins.
b) ASR: Similarly, the attacker aims to mislead the ASR
into assigning any transcription to the input other than the cor-
rect one. Consider the motivating example from Section II-D1,
the ASR transcribes the original audio as LOCK. The adversary
modifies the audio sample to produce an adversarial sample. If
the ASR transcribes the adversarial sample as anything other
than LOCK, the attacker wins.
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2) Targeted: A targeted attack is one where the attacker
wants to get a specific response from the VPS.
a) SI: In the case of an SI, the attacker goal is to force
it to identify the attacker’s chosen person as the speaker of the
audio. For example, the attacker wants the SI to believe that
the audio belongs to Bob (or that the audio sample contains
silence), even though it does not.
b) ASR: Similarly, in the case of an ASR, the attacker
attempts to force the model to mistranscribe the input audio to
a chosen transcription. Consider the ASR from Section II-D1,
the attacker wants the ASR to assign the label OPEN to the
audio sample. Compared to untargeted attacks, targeted ones
can be harder to achieve when sequence pairs have closer
semantics than others. For example, it may be easier to force
the model to mistranscribe the audio for the word LOCK
to CLOCK than to OPEN.
The only difference between targeted and untargeted attacks
is the attacker’s intentions towards the ASR/SI. If the intent
is to force a specific output, then the attack is targeted. If
however, the goal is to get any output, as long as it is not the
correct one, then the attack is untargeted.
B. Types of Adversarial Attacks
Current attacks can be categorized as follows:
1) Optimization Attacks:
a) Direct: Attacks use the information about the weights
of the model to compute the gradients. These are then used to
perturb the original input to move it in the decision space.
b) Indirect: These attacks generate adversarial samples
by gradient estimation. This is done, indirectly, by repeatedly
querying the target model [43]. Making enough queries to the
model will reveal the underlying gradients and will help the
attacker craft a working sample.
2) Signal Processing Attacks: These attacks use signal
processing techniques to achieve the same goals as traditional
optimization attacks. The signal processing attack techniques
exploit discrepancies between the human ear and feature
extraction algorithms. These attacks do not directly target the
inference component of the pipeline, but nevertheless can still
force the inference component to make incorrect predictions.
Leveraging this divergent behavior enables signal processing
attacks to be faster, more query efficient, and less model
dependent compared to their optimization counterparts [7].
3) Miscellaneous Attacks: These are the attacks that do not
fall into any of the above two categories. These can exploit
the VPS by targeting the limitations of the hardware (e.g., the
microphone) or adding random noise. The range of miscella-
neous attacks is very broad. For example, there is extensive
work that has been done in the space of replay attacks [56],
[57], [58]. Here an attacker captures the voice of a victim
and attempts to exploit the VPS by replaying it the captured
audio. Similarly, there are a number of attacks that exploit the
inability of ASRs to distinguish between homophones: words
that are spelled differently but sound the same (e.g., flour vs
flower) [59], [60]. This happens when a single homophone is
passed alone to the ASR. For example, just passing the word
flower/flour, instead of as part of a sentence ‘which flowers
grow in the summer’. Having a sentence provides context that
allows the ASR to successfully differentiate the homophones.
However, these attacks do not exploit any specific part of the
VPS pipeline and are therefore outside the scope of this paper.
C. Adversarial Knowledge
A stronger attack is one that assumes the adversary has little
knowledge of the VPS components. A VPS is comprised of a
few different components (Figure 1). For the purposes of sim-
plicity, we will group these components into five categories.
1) Component Categories: VPS components include task,
preprocessing, feature extraction, inference, and decoding.
Information about a single component in one category, implies
knowledge of all other components in the same category.
• Task: The problem the model is trained to solve (e.g.,
speech transcription) and data the model was trained on.
For example, if an adversary is attacking an English
language transcription model, she is aware that the system
has been trained on an English language data-set.
• Preprocessing: A VPS first preprocesses the audio (Fig-
ure 1(b)). Knowledge of this step includes information
about the algorithm and parameters being used for down-
sampling, noise reduction and low-pass filtering.
• Feature Extraction: As discussed in Section II-B, a VPS
pipeline is made up of multiple signal processing steps
for feature extraction. Knowledge of this component
(Figure 1(c)), allows the attacker to infer the feature
extraction algorithm used by the VPS.
• Inference: This step outputs a probability distribution
over the labels (Figure 1(d)). This category includes
knowledge of the weights, type, number of the layers
and architecture of the model used for inference.
• Decoding: This step (Figure 1(e)) converts the probability
distribution into a human readable transcription. This cat-
egory includes information about the decoding algorithm
(e.g., beam search) and its parameters.
Having defined the components, we now categorize the
different knowledge types (Table I):
a) White-Box: The attacker has perfect knowledge of all
the above categories, even though an attack may exploit only
a specific component. A white-box attack is the best case sce-
nario for the attacker. An example this access type is an open
source model (e.g., DeepSpeech-2 [26] or Kaldi [27] [25]).
b) Grey-Box: The attacker has knowledge of only a
subset of the categories. She might have complete knowledge
of some components, and limited or no knowledge of others.
An example is Azure Speaker Recognition model [61] [4].
The information about this system’s filter extraction and task
category is publicly available [62]. However, there is no
information about the preprocessing, inference and decoding
components are unknown to the public.
c) Black-Box: The attacker has knowledge of only the
task category. For example, the attacker only knows that the
target system is an English language transcription model. This
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Knowledge Task
Pre-
processing
Feature
Extract Inference Decoding
White-Box 3 3 3 3 3
Grey-Box ? ? ? ? ?
Black-Box 3 7 7 7 7
No-Box 7 7 7 7 7
Table I: Different categories of knowledge available to the
attacker. “7” information unavailable to the attacker. “3”
information available to the attacker. “?” information may or
may not be available to the attacker.
information is generally available for any public VPS. An ex-
ample of this is Google Speech API [63], Amazon Alexa [10]
and Siri [11]. In contrast, the preprocessing, feature extraction,
inference and decoding components are all unknown.
d) No-Box: This is an extreme version of the black-box
access type. The attacker has no knowledge of any of the
categories. Consider the example of the attacker attempting
to subvert a telephony surveillance system. Infrastructure for
such a surveillance system uses VPSes to efficiently convert
millions of hours of captured call audio into searchable text.
The attacker does not have access to this infrastructure. She
only knows that her phone calls will be captured and tran-
scribed. Of all the knowledge types, this is the most restrictive.
A no-box setting is the worst-case scenario for the attacker.
D. Adversarial Capabilities
1) Constrains on the Input Manipulations:
a) Input and Output Granularity: Attacks against VPSes
are of three granularities: phoneme1, word and sentence level.
These measure two aspects about the attack: the window of
input that the attacker will need to perturb and total change
in output transcription. For example, consider an attacker who
can mistranscribe an entire sentence by only changing a single
phoneme. Here, the input granularity is phoneme and the
output granularity is sentence. Similarly, if the attacker needs
to perturb the entire sentence to change the transcription of a
single word, then input granularity is sentence and the output
granularity is word.
b) Types of Adversarial Audio: Depending on the attack
type and scenario, adversaries can produce different types of
audio samples. These audio samples can be categorized into
the following broad classes:
• Inaudible: As discussed in Section II-A, the human
auditory system can only perceive frequencies that range
from 20Hz to 20kHz. In contrast, by using microphones
to capture audio, VPSes can record frequencies beyond
20kHz. To exploit this discrepancy, attackers can encode
an audio command in the ultrasound frequency range
(20kHz to 10Mhz). The encoded command is detected
and recorded by the microphone but is inaudible to the
human listener. The recorded command is then passed
onto the VPS which executes it, considering it human
speech. These inaudible attacks have been able to exploit
modern VPS devices such as Alexa, Siri, and Google
Home [42]. These attacks can not be filtered out in
1A phoneme is a single distinct unit of sound in a language.
software, as they exploit the hardware component (micro-
phone) of the pipeline. The audio sample is aliased down
to less than 20kHz when recorded by the microphone.
However, these attacks might still leave artifacts in the
signal that can potentially reveal the attack. While attacks
in this space focus on the ultrasound frequencies, the
frequency range below 20Hz is also inaudible and could
be a vector in this class of attack.
• Noise: This category of attacks produces audio samples
that sound like noise to humans but are considered
legitimate audio commands by the VPS. It is difficult for
the human auditory system to interpret audio that is non-
continuous, jittery and lossy. Attacks can mangle audio
samples such that they will not be intelligible by humans
and will (hopefully) be ignored as mere noise. However,
the same mangled audio sample is processed by the VPS
as legitimate speech. This can allow attackers to trick a
VPS into unauthorized action.
• Clean: The last category of attacks perturb audio such
that it sounds clean to humans even though there is
a hidden command embedded inside it. These attacks
embed commands as low-intensity perturbations, into an
audio sample such as music, which is not noticeable by
humans. However, the VPS detects and executes these
embedded commands.
2) Access to the Model:
a) Queries: A query consists of sending the model an
input and receiving the corresponding output. As described in
Section II-D2, the attacker makes multiple queries to a target
model to produce a single adversarial sample. A threat model
must consider the maximum number of times an attacker can
query the victim system. Too many queries will alert the
defender of an attack. Additionally, most proprietary systems
require users to pay for every query. Too many queries can
quickly compound the monetary cost of an attack.
b) Output: A model can produce one of two types of
outputs. This can either be a single label (i.e., transcription),
or a probability distribution over all the labels.
A probability distribution over all the labels is the individual
probabilities of the input belonging to each of the labels. For
example, the modle might output the following distribution for
a recording of “lock”: LOCK: 90%, LOOK: 7% and LOKK:
3%. This means that the model is 90% , 7%, and 3% certain
that the input is “lock”, “look”, and “lokk” respectively.
The model is still calculating the probability distribution
when it outputs a single label. However, the model will only
return the label with the highest probability. It is entirely
possible for the adversary to have access to some combination
of both label and probability distribution. For example, she
may have the final label and the next top K labels.
3) Attack Medium: Depending on the scenario, the ad-
versarial sample can be passed to the system over different
mediums, each of which can introduce new challenges (e.g,
noise). In the case of adversarial images, the perturbed input
can be passed directly as a .jpg file. However, in a more
realistic scenario, the attacker will have to print the perturbed
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image, and hope when the target takes a picture of the image
that the perturbations are captured by the camera. In the case
of VPSes, the mediums can be broadly grouped into four
types: Over-Line (Figure 4(a)), Over-Air (Figure 4(b)), Over-
Telephony-Network (Figure 4(c)), and Over-Others. In this
section, we discuss each of the mediums in detail.
a) Over-Line: The input is passed to the model directly
as a Waveform Audio file or .wav (Figure 4(a)). Compared
to all the other mediums, attacks Over-Line are the easiest to
execute as this medium ensures “lossless” transmission.
b) Over-Air: Over-Air (Figure 4(b)), involves playing the
audio using a speaker. As an example, consider an attacker
who wants to exploit an Amazon Alexa. The attacker plays
the adversarial audio over the speaker, which travels through
the air. The audio is then recorded and interpreted by Alexa.
As mentioned earlier, adversarial perturbations are sensitive
and can be lost during transmission. In the Over-Air scenario,
the loss can occur due to interference, background noise or
imperfect acoustic equipment [64]. Therefore, attacks that
produce audio that can survive the highly lossy mediums of
air are much stronger than those that cannot.
c) Over-Telephony-Network: An attack Over-Telephony-
Network (Figure 4(c)), involves playing audio samples over
the telephony network and exploiting any VPS transcribing
the phone call. The telephony network is a lossy medium
due to static interference, codec compression, packet loss, and
jitter [65], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70]. Adversarial audio is
sensitive to lossy mediums and is at risk of losing perturbations
during transmission. Therefore, attacks that produce audio
samples that can survive the telephony network are also much
stronger than those that cannot.
d) Over-Others: This category includes mediums that do
not fall into the above three categories. One example of this
is MPEG-1 Audio Layer III or mp3 compression. The .wav
audio samples are often compressed using mp3 compression
before being transmitted. This compression technique is lossy
and is bound to result in some of the adversarial perturbations
being discarded. Attacks that produce perturbations that only
survive mp3 compression are stronger than Over-Line, but are
weaker than Over-Telephony-Network and Over-Air.
4) Distance: The further an attack audio sample travels
over a lossy medium, the greater the degradation. As a result,
the attack audio sample is less likely to exploit the target VPS.
One metric to measure the strength of an attack is the distance
it can travel without losing its exploitative nature.
5) Acoustic Environment: This includes the different acous-
tic environments that the attack audio sample was tested
in (e.g., noisy environments). This is because the various
mediums introduce unique sources of distortion. For Over-
Air attacks, this involves testing the attack audio sample with
varying levels of noise. For Over-Telephony-Network attacks,
this involves testing the attack over real telephony networks.
6) Acoustic Equipment: Over-Air and Over-Telephony-
Network attacks involve passing the audio samples over a
range of acoustic equipment. These include codecs, micro-
phones, speakers, etc., which are subject to hardware imperfec-
Figure 4: Depending on the threat model, an attack audio
might be passed over various mediums. (a) Over-Line Attack:
Audio file is passed directly to the target model as a .wav file.
(b) Over-Telephony-Network Attack: The audio transmitted
over the telephony network to the target model. (c) Over-Air
Attack: The audio file is played using a speaker. The audio
travels over the air and is recorded by a microphone. The
recorded signal is then passed onto the target model.
tions. Certain frequencies might be attenuated and intensified,
based on the particular equipment’s impulse response. How-
ever, if an attack audio sample does not work against a range
of equipment, then it is too sensitive. Any attack that makes
assumptions tied to a particular set of acoustic equipment is
considered weaker than one that does not.
V. EXISTING ATTACK CLASSIFICATION
We use the threat model taxonomy described in the previous
section to classify the existing attacks and identify the areas
that need improvement. Table II and Table III show the
progress of current attacks against VPSes.
1) Targeted White-box Attacks: Most targeted attacks in Ta-
ble II require complete white-box knowledge of the target [41],
[6], [72], [75], [73], [74], [76], [77]. All of these are based
on the optimization strategy and can embed hidden commands
inside audio samples such as music or noise. These attacks can
generate adversarial samples that are either clean or noisy.
One of two conditions must be satisfied for these attacks
to be applicable in the real-world. Either the attacker has
perfect knowledge of the target or the adversarial samples are
transferable. However, both these assumptions are impractical.
Regarding the former, it is unlikely for an attacker to have
perfect knowledge of the target VPS, primarily because these
systems are proprietary. For example, the underlying construc-
tion and functionality of ASRs such as Alexa and Siri are a
closely guarded trade secret. Similarly, the latter does not hold
either, as we will discuss in Section XI-A. As a result, these
white-box attacks are constrained against real-world systems
like Alexa or Siri.
2The most up-to-date version of this table can be found at:
https://sites.google.com/view/adv-asr-sok/
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Attack Name Audio Type Goal
Input
Granularity
Output
Granularity Knowledge Queries Output Medium Time
Taori et al. [71] Clean Targeted S S Gray ? Distribution L ?
Carlini et al. [6] Clean Targeted S S White 1000 Distribution L ?
Houdini [72] Clean Targeted S S White ? Distribution L ?
Kreuk et al. [73] Clean Targeted S S White ? Distribution L ?
Qin et al. [74] Clean Targeted S S White ? Distribution L ?
Schonherr et al. [75] Clean Targeted S S White 500 Distribution L ?
Abdoli et al. [76] Clean Targeted W W White ? Distribution L ?
Commander Song [41] Clean Targeted S S White ? Distribution L,A ?
Yakura et al. [77] Clean Targeted S S White ? Distribution L,A 18 hours
Devil’s Whisper [78] Clean Targeted S S Black 1500 Label L,A 4.6 hours
M. Azalnot et al. [79] Clean Targeted W W Black ? Label L ?
Kenansville Attack [29] Clean Untargeted P,W,S P,W,S No 15 Label L,T seconds
Dolphin Attack [42] Inaudible Targeted S S Black ? Label A ?
Light Commands [80] Inaudible Targeted S S Black ? Label A ?
Abdullah et al. [7] Noisy Targeted S S Black 10 Label L,A seconds
Cocaine Noodles [81] Noisy Targeted S S Black ? Label L,A ?
HVC (2) [82] Noisy Targeted S S Black ? Label L,A 32 hours
HVC (1) [82] Noisy Targeted S S White ? Distribution L ?
Table II: The table2 provides an overview of the current progress of the adversarial attacks against ASR and SI systems.
“?”: Authors provide no information in paper. “3”: Will work. “P,W,S” = Phoneme, Word, Sentence. “L,A,T” = Over-Line,
Over-Air, Over-Telephony-Network.
Attack Name
Attack
Type
VPS
Attacked
VPS
Internals ASR SI
Distance
(Approximate)
Acoustic
Equipment
Acoustic
Environment Transferability
Carlini et al. [6] Direct 1 RNN 3 7- 7- 7- 7- 7-
HVC (1) [82] Direct 1 RNN 3 7- 7- 7- 7- 7-
Houdini [72] Direct 1 RNN 3 3+ 7- 7- 7- 7-
Schonherr et al. [75] Direct 1 HMM 3 7 7- 7- 7- 7-
Kreuk et al. [73] Direct 1 RNN 7- 3+ 7- 7- 7- 7-
Qin et al. [74] Direct 1 RNN 3 7- 7- 7- 7- 7-
Yakura et al. [77] Direct 1 RNN 3 3- 0.5 meters 3 7- 7-
Commander Song [41] Direct 2 HMM 3 7- 1.5 meters 3 ? 3
Devil’s Whisper [78] Direct 3 ? 3 7- 5-200 cm 3 3 3
Abdoli et al. [76] Direct 5 CNN 3 7? 7- 7- 7- 7-
M. Azalnot et al. [79] Indirect 1 CNN 3 7 7 7 7 7
Taori et al. [71] Indirect 1 RNN 3 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
HVC (2) [82] Miscellaneous 1 ? 3 7- 0.5 meters 7- 7- 7-
Cocaine Noodles [81] Miscellaneous 1 ? 3 7- 30 cm 7- 7- 7-
Dolphin Attack [42] Miscellaneous 9 RNN,? 3 7 150 cm 3 3 3
Light Commands [80] Miscellaneous 4 ? 3 3 110 m NA NA 3
Kenansville Attack [29] Signal Processing 6 RNN,? 3 3 N/A 3 3 3
Abdullah et al. [7] Signal Processing 12 RNN,HMM,? 3 3 1 ft 3 3 3
Table III: The table shows the current progress of the adversarial attacks against ASR and SI systems.“?”: Authors provide no
information in paper.“3”: Will work. We sent each of the authors of the above papers emails regarding their papers and have
included the responses with “7” in the table. “7?”: Authors did not test it and are not sure if it will work. “7+”: Authors did
not test it and believe it will work. “7-”: Authors did not test it and believe it will not work.“7”: Authors did not respond to
correspondence but we believe it will not work.
White-box attacks have made significant contributions in
the space of adversarial ML. However, the authors generally
do not provide metrics to help identify the advantages of
their attacks over existing ones. These include metrics such
as max number of queries, time to produce an adversarial
audio sample etc. Generally, the attack methods make similar
assumptions (e.g., input/output granularity, goals, knowledge,
medium etc.), but exploit different ASR architectures. For
example, Carlini et al. [6] exploit DeepSpeech (CNN-RNN),
while Schonherr et al. [75] and Commander Song [41] both
target Kaldi (DNN-HMM).
2) Clean Attacks and Mediums: Clean audio attacks pro-
duce audio samples that sound clear to humans but are
mistranscribed by the ASR (Section IV-D). Although these
attacks have been demonstrated Over-Line, they have only
seen limited success over other mediums (Table III). There
are only a few attacks that can work Over-Air [41], [74], [77].
These are constrained as they require white-box knowledge of
the target, physical access to the victim’s acoustic equipment,
can take hours to generate, have limited physical range and
are sensitive to background noise. Similarly, there is only a
single attack [29] that can function Over-Telephony-Network.
However, it can not produce a targeted transcription.
Success Over-Line does not translate into success over other
mediums. There are a plethora of factors that contribute to
this limitation (Section IV-D3). These interfere with the ad-
versary generated perturbations, effectively blunting the attack.
Though these factors have a negligible impact on the ASR
understanding of a benign audio sample, these can frustrate the
efforts of the attacker. To enable clean attacks Over-Air and
Over-Telephony-Network, researchers can benefit from char-
acterizing and overcoming the various sources of interference.
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3) Signal Processing Attacks vs Rest: In comparison to
the other attack types, signal processing attacks have shown
greater promise, specifically in black-box settings. These at-
tacks have achieved the same goals as traditional optimization
attacks, specifically for noise [7] and untargeted attacks [29].
However, unlike their counterparts [82], signal processing
attacks are more efficient as they require less than 15 queries
and a few seconds to generate an attack sample. These attacks
assume black-box access, which has allowed them to be suc-
cessfully tested against more target VPSes than existing works.
However, clean targeted attacks based on signal processing
have not yet been demonstrated.
4) Attacks against SIs: Only a tiny subset of the existing
work has focused on attacking SI systems [73], [7], [29]
(Table III). This is a result of the similarity of the underlying
architectures of the SIs and ASRs. Generally, an attack against
ASR can be used wholesale to exploit an SI. This is true
for both signal processing and optimization attacks. This is
because, as discussed in Section II-C2, pipelines for systems
often constitute the same stages. If an attack exploits the
stage in the pipeline shared by both ASRs and SIs, it will
succeed against both. This is corroborated by the examples of
the same attacks being successfully used, as is, against both
systems. Signal processing attack papers [7], [29] have already
demonstrated this ability to exploit both ASRs and SIs.
5) Indirect Optimization Attacks: Indirect optimization at-
tacks attempt to generate adversarial samples by repeatedly
querying the model [79], [71] in a black-box setting (Table III).
These attacks have been demonstrated only at the word [79]
granularity. One might incorrectly assume that indirect attacks
can be used against real-world systems (e.g., Alexa) as these
do not require perfect knowledge of the target, but these
attacks have limited for a number of reasons. First, these
attacks require hundreds of thousands of queries to generate
a single attack audio sample. This makes attack execution
difficult as most ASR’s charge users a fee for each query [10].
Second, the audio samples generated using these attacks can
only be used over-line and have not been demonstrated over
other mediums. This is primarily due to the sensitivity of the
samples to loss/distortion (Section IV-D3). Third, these attacks
have not been demonstrated at the sentence level in a black-
box setting. The only attack [71] that comes close still requires
information about the distributions, and is therefore grey box.
Overcoming these limitations is a direction for future research.
6) Optimization Attacks Do Not Guarantee Success: Opti-
mization attacks explore the decision spaces using algorithms
like gradient descent. One well-known drawback of such
algorithms is that they can get stuck in local minima. This
means that it might not be possible to successfully perturb
every benign audio sample to evade the target VPS. In con-
trast, signal processing attacks have been free of this specific
limitation. These attacks have been able to guarantee attack
success for any benign audio sample.
7) Model Agnostic Attacks: Only a small subset of existing
attacks methods are black-box [79], [81], [42], [7], [29], [71]
(Table III) and therefore model agnostic, while the remain-
ing attacks are model dependent as each exploits a unique
component of the target VPS. For example, Carlini et al. [6]
exploit the CTC component of the DeepSpeech ASR [83],
which does not exist in the Kaldi ASR [25]. It is important
for future researchers to develop model agnostic attacks, since
newer ASR systems with distinct architectures and improved
accuracies are being introduced every day. In this highly
variable and continuously changing space, any attack that only
works against a single VPS type can quickly become obsolete.
VI. DEFENSE AND DETECTION TAXONOMY
We present a taxonomy to help categorize the space of
defenses and detection methods.
A. Attacker Type:
There are two types of attackers:
1) Non-adaptive: This attacker does not have any knowl-
edge of the target’s defense strategy and parameters. The
minimal criteria a viable defense strategy needs to meet is
to be able prevent non-adaptive attackers.
2) Adaptive: The attacker has full knowledge of the the
type and parameters of the defense strategy being employed.
Using this knowledge, the attacker can modify their attack
strategy in hopes of overcoming the defender. A strong defense
can prevent successful exploitation even in the presence of an
adaptive attacker.
B. Adversarial Cost:
1) Resources: A defense might force an attacker to expend
greater resources to produce adversarial audio samples. For
example, an attacker would be forced to make additional
queries to the model. A defense is strong if it can increase the
resources required for a viable attack by a significant margin.
2) Distortion: The goal of an attacker is to control the
degree of audible distortion introduced due to perturbations.
For example, in order to circumvent VPSes used in telephony
surveillance system, the adversary has the dual aims of evading
the VPS and ensuring low audible distortion. Large distortions
might make the audio message difficult to understand. A
defense strategy might aim to force the attacker to increase
the audible distortion needed to successfully create an attack
sample. Adding too much distortion will make the attack audio
sample difficult to understand, preventing the second aim.
A strong defense will force the attacker to add significant
amounts of additional distortion to the sample, such that it
becomes a determent to their original aims. However, measure
audible distortion is difficult, due to lack of any psychoacoustic
metric, as discussed later in Section VIII-6.
C. Stochastic Modeling:
Defenses against these attacks can often use stochastic (or
ML) models as part of the pipeline. Such techniques gather
different features that might help differentiate an adversarial
sample from a benign one. These features are then used to
train a ML model to do the classification. A strong defense
does not rely on ML models as these models are themselves
vulnerable to exploitation.
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Name Stochastic Model
Additional
Hardware
Attacker
Type Distance
Attack
Type
Audio
Type Medium ASR SI Adversarial Cost
Resources Distortion
Wang et al. [84] 3 3 ? ? Miscellaneous N/A A ? ? ? ?
VoicePop [85] 3 7 ? 6 cm Miscellaneous N/A A ? ? ? ?
Blue et al. [64] 7 7 ADPT 5 m Miscellaneous N/A A ? ? ? ?
Wang et al. [86] 3 3 ? ? Miscellaneous Noisy A ? ? ? ?
Yang et al. [87] 7 7 N-ADPT N/A Direct Clean L 3 7 ? ?
Table IV: The table3 provides an overview of the current defenses for ASR and SI systems. “?”: Authors provide no information
in paper. “7”: Does not work or has not been demonstrated. “3”: Will work. “P,W,S” = Phoneme, Word, Sentence. “L,A,T”
= Over-Line, Over-Air, Over-Telephony-Network. “ADPT, N-ADPT” = Adaptive Attacker, Non-Adaptive Attacker.
D. Additional Hardware:
Some defense techniques might require sensors in addition
to the microphone. This is problematic as it increases the
cost of manufacturing the home assistants. Due to already
thin profit margins [88], additional sensor cost will decrease
the likelihood of manufacturers incorporating the defense. A
strong defense does not incur any additional deployment costs.
E. Distance:
When defending against Over-Air attacks, some techniques
are only effective if the source of the adversarial audio is
within a certain distance from the target. This is because
the defense techniques might use certain identifying features,
which might otherwise be lost during transmission. The longer
the distance, the stronger the defense.
It is worth discussing the ideal distance. Over-Air attacks
require an audio sample to be played over a speaker that is
present within the same room as the target VPS. Within the
US, rooms are on average 11ft by 16ft [89]. This means in the
worst case, the attacker will need to play an audio file from
the farther part of the room. If the target VPS is in one corner
of the room and the attacker’s speaker in the other corner, this
distance will come down to 20ft (Pythagorean Theorem).
F. Attack Type:
This is the specific type of attack the strategy is supposed to
protect against (Section IV-B). These include signal processing
attacks, direct optimization and indirect optimization attacks.
A strong defense is universal i.e., stops any type of attack.
G. Audio Type:
This is the specific type of audio that strategy is designed
to defeat (Section IV-D1.0.2). These include clean, inaudible,
and noisy audio. A strong defense is universal i.e., can stop
an adversarial audio of any type.
H. Medium:
The medium the strategy is designed to defend (Sec-
tion IV-D3). A strong defense can stop an attack over any
medium (Over-Air, Over-Telephony, and Over-Line).
3The most up-to-date version of this table can be found at:
https://sites.google.com/view/adv-asr-sok/
VII. DEFENSES AND DETECTION CLASSIFICATION
There has been little published work in the space of de-
fenses and detection mechanisms for adversarial audio. In this
section, we discuss how the most popular defense strategy
from the adversarial image space, adversarial training, is not
effective in the audio domain. We also analyze the published
mechanism for detecting adversarial audio and propose a
direction for future research.
A. Adversarial training
This defense involves training the model on samples per-
turbed using adversarial algorithms. This strategy has shown
promise in the adversarial image space [90]. Intuitively, this
improves the decision boundary, by either making it more
robust to attacks or by making adversarial samples harder to
craft by obfuscating the gradients. To exploit the adversarially
trained model, the attacker will either need to run the attack
algorithm for more iterations or introduce greater distortion to
the adversarial input. We argue that this is not be an effective
method for defending VPSes.
First, adversarial training can decrease the accuracy of the
model. This phenomenon is known as label leaking [91]. Here,
the adversarially trained model shows improved robustness
to adversarial samples, but at the cost of decreased accuracy
on legitimate samples. Given that VPSes (e.g. Siri, Amazon
Alexa) are user-facing, reducing their accuracy will degrade
the user experience and consequently, the vendor’s profits.
Second, adversarial training might not work against the signal
processing attacks discussed in Section IV-B2. These generate
perturbations that are filtered out during feature extraction [7],
[42]. Thus, both adversarial and legitimate samples will collide
to similar feature vectors. As a result, adversarial training
might decrease model accuracy with no improvement to ro-
bustness [29]. This is different from label leaking as the model
accuracy for both benign and adversarial samples will suffer.
B. Liveness Detection
Considering the limitations of adversarial training, it is
important to discuss detection strategies that have shown some
success. Detection mechanisms are designed to help identify
whether an audio sample is benign or malicious. Detection
often suffers from the same limitations as adversarial training:
for instance, both fare poorly against adaptive adversaries.
Liveness detection is an area of research that aims to identify
whether the source of speech was a real human or a mechanical
speaker. It can help prevent replay audio attacks i.e., an
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attacker plays an audio of someone ordering something back
to their home assistant. This is a popular research area with
yearly competitions [92]. Considering this is still an open
research area, we only cover a handful of important works,
shown in Table IV.
Liveness detection can help detect Over-Air attacks as they
require playing the audio over mechanical speakers. However,
works in this area limited to a number of reasons. First, these
works [84], [85], [86] employ ML models as part of the
pipeline. This adds another layer of vulnerability as attackers
have the ability to exploit ML models using adversarial
algorithms. This means an adaptive attacker, with knowledge
of the detection method, can overcome it. Second, these works
either require the distance between the source and target to be
very small [85] or the authors fail to disclose this number at all
Table IV [84], [86]. An attacker can merely execute the attack
from a distance further than the one ideal of the detection
method to work. One mechanism that has shown promise is
Blue et al. [64]. This defense is effective at a much larger
distance and is not defeated by an adaptive attacker.
C. Future Direction
It is worth discussing future directions that may not guar-
antee success. An example of this is redesigning the feature
extraction and preprocessing stages. Signal processing attacks
are thus far unique to ASR systems. These attacks exploit
limitations and vulnerabilities in the preprocessing and feature
extraction phases of the ASR pipeline. Even though the
existence of this class of adversarial examples is clear, these
are still not easy to resolve. This is because the techniques that
are used during feature extraction (e.g., the DFT) have taken
decades to develop [20]. These techniques are well understood
by the research community and have significantly improved
the accuracy of ASR systems. Developing new techniques that
not only resolve current security flaws but also maintain high
ASR accuracy is difficult and does not guarantee robustness.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we highlight key findings, discuss their
implications and make recommendations for future research.
1) Lack of Transferability for Optimization Attacks: Trans-
ferability has been shown for signal processing attacks. How-
ever until now, this question was largely unanswered for
the case of optimization attacks. In this paper, we empiri-
cally demonstrate that transferability of optimization attacks
is unlikely in the audio domain. In fact, this is true even
if both surrogate and remote target models share the same
architecture, hyperparameters, random seed and training data.
This is a result of training on GPUs, which introduces non-
determinism that can lead to the VPSes learning different
decision boundaries [93]. Therefore, for adversarial audio
samples to transfer, the adversary must not only have com-
plete information of the model’s training parameters, but also
be able to predict the GPU-induced randomness during the
training process. We believe that this latter requirement is
unrealistic for practical adversaries.
The only optimization attack that has demonstrated transfer-
ability, although in a limited sense, is Commander Song [41].
The authors were able to transfer samples generated for the
Kaldi ASR [25] to iFlytek [94], but failed when transferring
the samples to DeepSpeech [95]. A likely hypothesis is that
iFlytek is using a fine-tuned version of the same pre-trained
Kaldi ASR, as has been the case in the past [94]. Thus a caveat
to the lack of transferability is that adversarial samples may
be transferred between a fine-tuned model and its pre-trained
counterpart. This could be explained by the fact that decision
boundaries do not change significantly during the fine-tuning
process. Additionally, an increasing number of vendors are
transitioning to NN based systems, away from the HMMs
that the Kaldi ASR employs internally. Therefore, the question
of lack of transferability for optimization attacks should be
considered more seriously with regards to NN based ASRs.
2) Defenses for VPSes: A number of defenses have been
proposed for the computer vision domain [96], [97], [98], [99],
[100], [101], [102], [103], [104]. These have been primarily
designed to defend against adversaries who might exploit
transferability. However, the transferability is difficult in the
audio domain, and attackers rarely have white-box access
to target VPSes (e.g., Amazon Alexa). This minimizes the
threat of existing white-box attacks against real world systems.
Consequently, researchers should focus on building defenses
against attacks that have been demonstrated in black-box
settings, such as signal processing attacks [7], [29].
3) VPSes Pipeline: The modern VPS pipeline is completely
different from that of image models, due to presence of
additional components. Each of these components increases
the attack surface, introducing a unique set of vulnerabilities
that an attacker may be able to exploit. The full scope of
vulnerabilities has yet to be uncovered, with some attacks
(e.g., clean, targeted attacks) not having been demonstrated.
Therefore, future research should focus on identifying and ex-
ploiting novel weaknesses within the pipeline. Similarly, if the
entire pipeline can be attacked, then the entire pipeline needs
to be defended. Thus, we recommend that future research
efforts focus on building robust defenses for each individual
component of the pipeline.
4) Lack of Poisoning and Privacy Attacks: This paper
focuses on evasion attacks to the detriment of other adversarial
machine learning attacks such as poisoning attacks and privacy
attacks [31]. This is because, to the best of our knowledge, no
poisoning attacks or privacy attacks have been proposed for
speech. And existing attacks which may apply have not been
evaluated. This is an interesting direction for future research to
explore. Poisoning attacks generate audio samples that, when
added to the training data, make the model misbehave in an
attacker-controlled way. For example, poisoning can be used
prevent the model from correctly transcribing certain types of
inputs. In contrast, privacy attacks attempt to uncover informa-
tion about the model’s training data. For example, an attacker
may want to determine if the voice of a certain individual was
used for training a speaker identification system.
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5) Detection Mechanisms: While observing Table IV, an
astute reader might have realized that no mechanism yet exists
to defend against telephony-attacks. while liveness detection
and temporal based mechanisms have demonstrated some
success in addressing Over-Air and Over-Line attacks. These
methods are not perfect, but still constitute a positive step
towards addressing these attacks. In stark contrast, there is
no work that addresses Over-Telephony attacks. Given that
these attacks can be most reliably executed against real world
surveillance systems, it would be ideal to focus research efforts
in this space.
6) Lack of Audio Intelligibility Metrics: A number of
methods have been used to measure intelligibility of audio.
However, these methods have limitations. Researchers have
used metrics from the computer vision domain such as the
L2-norm [6]. This is not an adequate metric to measure audio
intelligibility as the human ear does not exhibit linear behavior
(Section II-A). Thus, audio samples that are jarring to the
human ear, can still have small L2-norm [7]. In addition, prior
work often includes users studies that measure the quality
of attack audio samples [72], [82], [29], [74]. Unfortunately,
these studies do not consider the full range of variables that
impact human intelligibility. These include age [105], [106],
first language [107], audio equipment, hearing range [108]
and environmental noise. Future works should consider these
variables to improve generalizability of their findings. Finally,
some researchers use audio quality metrics designed for the
telephony netowrks. These are metrics are designed to measure
audio quality of telephony lines [67], [109] and effectively
measure quantities like jitter, packet loss, and white-noise;
which are facets of audio that existing attacks do not target.
Psychoacoustics is a promising direction for designing suit-
able audio intelligibility metrics. Recall from Section II-A that
human perception of speech is affected by a combination of
mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are quantitative and
can be used to construct hearing models [110]. An example
is audio masking [8]. Attack perturbations are, in effect,
frequencies that have been introduced to the benign audio sam-
ples. Some of these frequencies will mask other frequencies.
This masking effect can be measured using metrics such as
tone-to-noise ratio and prominence ratio. These metrics, in
combination with other metrics from an hearing model, can
help measure the quality of an adversarial speech sample.
IX. CONCLUSION
Modern VPSes use neural networks to convert audio sam-
ples into text (ASRs) or identify the speaker (SIs). However,
neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to ad-
versarial machine learning attacks. These can force VPSes
to act maliciously. In this paper, we present a threat model
framework to evaluate existing works in the adversarial space
against VPSes. We identify the unique contributions, open
problems and future research directions.
The space of attacks against VPSes is different and more
complex than that of their image counterparts. This is because
VPSes are comprised of additional phases including process-
ing, feature extraction, and decoding algorithms. This means
attacks against image models cannot be easily extended to
VPSes. This has lead to the development of attacks designed
for VPSes. However, most of these attacks can not be used
against real-world systems. This is primarily due to lack of
success in black-box settings, failure Over-Air, and limited
transferability. There has also been limited development of
adequate defenses for VPSes. While there are a plethora of
defenses and detection mechanisms in the image domain, only
one exists for VPSes, which is limited to optimization attacks.
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XI. APPENDIX
A. Transferability
The transferability property of adversarial samples is a
cornerstone of black-box attacks in the image domain (Sec-
tion II-D3). In contrast, transferability has had varying success
in the audio domain. While signal processing attacks can
generate transferable samples, transferability of gradient-based
optimization attacks is unclear. While most attack papers
do not test for transferability, those that have attempted to,
have largely demonstrated unsuccessful results [72], [41].
Considering this major discrepancy between the image and
audio domains, we explore experimentally the transferability
question for VPSes. Our goal is to ascertain whether adversar-
ial audio samples generated via optimization attacks transfer.
B. Setup
1) Training: Testing for transferability requires training a
number of ASRs. We use DeepSpeech [95] for this experiment,
even though there are a variety of ASR architectures in use
today. This is motivated by two reasons. First, DeepSpeech
employs NNs. NN architectures are the most popular and
widely used, allowing us to make conclusions applicable
to a wider population. Second, as researchers and vendors
increasingly phase out non-NN architectures in favor of NNs,
our conclusions will be applicable for future systems.
We trained nine DeepSpeech ASRs to achieve the state-
of-the-art Word Error Rate (WER) of 8% [95]. These ASRs
Target Transcription Benign SamplesPerturbed
Adversarial
Audio Generated
delete my messages 98 1867
browse to evil website 98 1086
what is the weather today 98 1525
go to evil website 98 1652
open the door 98 2253
transfer money to my account 98 1180
the fault dear is not in our stars 98 1312
turn off all the cameras 98 1401
text mom i need money 98 1400
order me some candy 98 1812
take a picture 98 1755
Total 17243
Table V: The table above shows the results of the transferabil-
ity experiments for the Carlini et al. attack. The attack was run
for 1000 iterations for each of the 98 audio files. There are
a varying number of adversarial samples produced for each
target transcription. This is because we generated both high
confidence (high distortion) and low confidence (low distor-
tion). For example, audio1.wav with target “open the door”
may be perturbed to generate three high confidence (greater
than 0.9) samples at iteration 103, 110, and 200. However,
for audio2.wav with target “text mom I need money”, no
high confidence adversarial sample may be possible. Each
of the generated adversarial samples (e.g, 2253 for malicious
command “open the door”) was then passed to eight models
trained with different initial seeds and one model trained on the
same seed. None of the 17243 samples transfered successfully.
were trained on a cluster of GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPUs, had
2048 hidden units per layer, were trained on the LibriSpeech
dataset [111] for 13 epochs, and took approximately two
days of training each (a total of 180 hours of training time).
This training setup closely resembles the official DeepSpeech
documentation [95]. All the ASRs were trained on the same
train-test splits and hyper-parameters, except initial random
seed. This was the only parameter that was varied, with each
ASR being trained on a unique seed value. This is done to
emulate the attacker who has perfect knowledge of the ASR’s
training parameters, except the initial random seed. Next, we
trained ASRs with the same hyper-parameters, including the
seed. This is the best-case scenario for the attacker as she has
absolute knowledge of the ASR’s training parameters.
2) Adversarial Sample Generation: While a number of
optimization attacks exist, it is impractical to evaluate ev-
ery attack with respect to transferability. Luckily, existing
optimization attacks do follow the same generic template.
These attacks minimize loss functions, use partial derivatives
to compute the model’s sensitives to the inputs to perturb the
input and threshold audible distortion using similar metrics
(generally the L2-norm). One such representative attack is
Carlini et al. [6], which provides the added advantage of being
effective against NN based ASRs. Additionally, other opti-
mization attacks have been built directly [74] or indirectly [77]
on this attack. Consequently, we choose the Carlini et al. [6]
to perturb attack audio samples.
Next, we create a set of audio samples that will be perturbed
using the adversarial algorithm. We follow the methodology
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outlined in Liu et al. [51]. We pass the test set samples from
the LibriSpeech dataset to each of our ASR models and pick
the 98 samples that all the models transcribed correctly. This
methodology is ideal for two reasons. First, by sampling from
the test set, we ensure that our audio samples lie within the
same distribution as the training data, ensuring consistency.
Second, we want our experimental setup to allow for the
highest chance of transferability. This enables us to make less
error prone conclusions.
We perturbed the set of 98 audio samples that all ASRs
transcribed correctly. These audio samples were perturbed
using 1000 iterations of the attack to force the ASR, called
the surrogate, to produce a specific target transcription. We tar-
get a total of 11 transcriptions, shown in Table V. The attacks
were used to generate two types of adversarial audio samples:
high audible distortion (and high transcription confidence) and
low audible noise (and low transcription confidence). This was
done specifically to explore whether samples with high audible
distortion transfer better than ones with low distortion.
Transferring a targeted transcription is not as easy as we
want the target ASR to assign a specific text to the audio.
This is because, in the decision space, an adversarially chosen
transcription might be very far from the original one. If on
the other hand, the chosen transcription is very close the
original one, then transferability is more likely. The closest
transcription to the original, in the decision space, is the one
with the second highest probability after the original. For
example, if the original transcription is “Mary had a little
lamb”, the second most likely transcriptions might be “Mary
belittled a lamb”. Intuitively, it will be easier to move from
“Mary had a little lamb”to “Mary belittled a lamb” than to
“open the door”. This should be the case as we train the models
on the same data partitions and the vocabulary. However, if
transferability is not possible in this ideal case, than it is very
unlikely for more realistic cases.
To answer whether transferability is possible at all i.e.,
in the easiest case, we designed the following experiment.
We perturbed each audio sample to produce two adversarial
samples with the second and third most likely transcriptions
as our target attack transcriptions. For example, consider the
original audio sample that correctly transcribes to “Mary had a
little lamb”. It’s second and third most likely transcriptions are
“Mary belittled a lamb” and “Mary had a spittle blam”. We use
these as the targets, instead of using a malicious one (“open
the door”). Then we repeat the adversarial audio perturbation
steps from the previous experiments.
3) Transferring Samples: Next, the adversarial samples are
passed to the ASRs, which we refer to as the remote targets.
The transferability is considered a success if the remote target
ASRs transcribe the attack audio sample as the attacker’s
chosen text. We count the number of times transferability
succeeded and use it as a metric for transferability success.
C. Results
Are adversarial audio samples perturbed via optimiza-
tion attacks transferable?
We first explore this question with regards to ASRs that
share all the training parameters, except the random seed. We
observed that none of the adversarial samples successfully
transfered (i.e., none of the remote target ASRs assigned
the attacker chosen transcriptions to the audio) (Table V).
This includes both the adversarial samples with high and
low distortion. We wanted to explore whether the attack
transcriptions existed in the top 10 most probable transcrip-
tions. However, the attack transcriptions were not present in
the top 10 transcriptions. This experiment demonstrates that
transferability, tested over thousands of samples, is unlikely
for ASRs trained on different seeds.
Do adversarial audio samples transfer if the model is
trained on the same seed?
We trained another set of nine ASRs with the same training
set and hyper-parameters, including the random seed. Here, the
goal is to check if adversarial samples will transfer between
two models that have the exact same training parameters. We
used adversarial samples that were generated from the previ-
ous experiment. None of the adversarial samples transferred
successfully (Table V). This is a result of the non-determinism
introduced in GPUs during training which resulted in ASRs
with differing decision boundaries [93] and contains similar
findings in the context of model extraction. Similar to the
previous experiment, the the attack transcriptions were not
present in the top 10 transcriptions. This means even if an
attacker has perfect knowledge of the target ASR’s training
parameters (train-test splits, the hyper-parameters, the archi-
tecture, etc), adversarial samples still may not transfer unless
all sources of non-determinism have been accounted for.
In what cases is transferability possible at all?
This experiment makes transferability most likely. The
chosen attack transcriptions are very close to the original
benign ones. We recorded transferability for this scenario.
For the second most likely transcription, the transferability
for the low confidence (low distortion) and high confidence
(high distortion) was 6.5% and 40% respectively. Similarly,
the attack transcriptions were in the top 10 labels 68% of the
time. However, for the third most likely transcription, these
numbers dropped to 3.0%, 31%, and 63%.
These numbers reveal two important facets about audio
adversarial samples. First, even if the attacker-chosen tran-
scription is almost exactly the same as the original, the
probability of a successful transcription is low (6.5%). This
probability drops significantly (from 6.5% to 3.0%) when the
target transcription moves from second to third most likely.
Second, the transferability of low confidence (low distortion)
samples is much lower than high confidence (high distortion)
samples. This is because high confidence samples are further
away from the decision boundaries. As a result, these are
more likely to transfer to a different model with an altered
decision boundary. This means that generally speaking, none
of the optimization attacks we experimented with will transfer
to other instances of the same ASR. This is due to substantial
non-determinism of the GPU and the community should work
towards attacks that can overcome this.
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Target Transcription Benign SamplesPerturbed
Adversarial
Audio Generated
delete my messages 98 29968
browse to evil website 98 30000
what is the weather today 98 30000
go to evil website 98 30000
open the door 98 64293
transfer money to my account 98 30000
turn off all the cameras 98 30000
order me some candy 98 30000
take a picture 98 30000
Total 239968
Table VI: The table above shows the results of the transfer-
ability experiments for the PGD attack. The attack was run for
1000 iterations for each of the 98 audio files. For each attack,
we only produced 3000 attack audio files, each of confidence
greater than 0.9. Each of the generated adversarial samples
was then passed to eight models trained with different initial
seeds and one model trained on the same seed. None of the
239968 samples transfered successfully.
D. Transferability (PGD)
To verify whether transferability is hard in ASRs or is a
facet of the Carlini attack, we decided to run the same set of
experiments with a different optimization attack. This time,
we used the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method [112],
which has been successfully demonstrated against image mod-
els. We chose this attack over other optimization attacks as
it can produce high confidence attack samples. Most other
attacks, including the Carlini attack, stop at the boundary. This
is especially true for psychoacoustic attacks [75], [74] which
are designed to produce imperceptible perturbations instead
of high confidence ones. In contrast, we wanted to produce
high confidence samples as these are more likely to transfer,
as demonstrated in the image space.
1) Setup: We followed the same methodological steps like
the ones described for the transferability experiment described
in Section XI-A. The attack was run for 1000 iterations and
clipped using the L infinity norm of 5%. The clipping was
done to ensure that the attack was not completely uncon-
strained. Otherwise, the audio samples would sound like noise.
We generated a total of 250,000 adversarial audio samples over
8 sentences and for each of the 9 models.
2) Results: The results can be seen in Table VI. None of
the 250,000 attack files successfully transferred. This is the
case for both the models trained using the same seed and
ones trained on different seeds. These results match that of
the Carlini attack experiments (Section XI-A). This means that
the difficulty of transferring attack audio is not a by-product of
the attacks themselves. Instead, this stems from some inherent
property of ASRs.
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